The paper presents a novel multi-level hierarchical approach which models the oligopolistic and competitive behavior of carriers and their relationships in maritime freight transportation networks. With the merger of the carriers' industry and some dominant carriers in a shipping market, the carrier competition frequently exhibits an oligopolistic nature. Three types of carriers are considered herein; ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators. The oligopolistic ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators compete with each other in their pricing and routing decisions, respectively. The carriers determine service charges and delivery routes at different parts of the multimodal freight network, having hierarchical interactions. In a game theoretic approach, ocean carriers are regarded as the leaders in an oligopoly shipping market. Port terminal operators are the followers of ocean carriers as well as the leaders of land carriers. For the individual carrier problems, Nash equilibrium is used to find the optimal decisions for which each carrier obtains the greatest profit. A threelevel model is formulated to capture the interactions among different types of carriers. A numerical example is presented to demonstrate the validity and capability of the model.
Introduction
Ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators provide transportation services in maritime freight transportation networks. Port terminal operators, providing transportation services within a port complex, are regarded as a special type of the carrier. Ocean carriers typically transport freight between ports via waterways; port terminal operators handle freight within their port complex; and land carriers deliver freight from port terminals to inland destinations. The three types of carriers make decisions on prices and delivery routes (or port services) at different parts of the multimodal freight network, having hierarchical interactions.
The top 10 ocean carriers deliver 57.7% of the world maritime shipment. In particular, the three big ocean carriers of APM-Maersk, Mediterranean Shg Co and CMA CGM Group transported 33.5% (AXS-Alphaliner, 2009) , showing relatively significant market shares. These companies cover most of the primary maritime routes and port terminals over the world. On the other hand, many ocean transportation firms have been engaged in global alliances (i.e., Grand Alliance (GA) and New World Alliance (NWA)). With the dominant ocean carriers and the merger of the carriers' industry (Luberoff, 2000) , the carrier competition exhibits an oligopolistic nature, while an infinite number of firms lead to perfect competition.
Similar market trends could be applied to port terminal operators and land carriers. Most ports consist of several port terminals, generally managed by private terminal operators. The port terminal operators cooperate to promote service efficiencies if their competition causes suboptimal facility utilization and increased congestion. The cooperating companies may increase their dominance in a competitive region, having certain power in setting the price instead of being simply price takers. This market condition is considered to be oligopoly. Similarly, land carriers may collaborate to reduce costs and unproductive trips in local transport operations and possibly create some powerful transportation firms that manipulate the market to their own advantage.
Research efforts to consider distinctive roles of different types of carriers and their relationships has been quite limited, with the majority of relevant articles focusing on the type of carrier problems. Most models in the literature have captured interactions between shippers and ocean carriers or port terminal operators, assuming the behavior of the other carriers is known. Particularly, the oligopolistic competitive behavior of the carriers has been rarely analyzed despite real world trends. This paper aims to formulate a predictive network model that captures the interactions among three types of carriers in an oligopoly shipping market. The model focuses on the behavior of the carriers in setting their service charges and routes.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents an up-to-date literature review of the existing models that predict maritime freight movements. The third section defines the research problem with network structures and modeling approaches. The fourth section formulates individual carrier models and a threelevel model. The fifth section develops a solution algorithm. The sixth section deploys a numerical example to demonstrate the applicability of the model. The last section concludes the paper and suggests directions for future research.
Literature Review
Freight network models predict freight movements by capturing the behavior and relationship of key stakeholders, representing the transportation network explicitly. The three common modeling methodologies of freight network equilibrium models, spatial price equilibrium models and integrated network equilibrium models (Harker, 1985; Crainic, 2002; Valsaraj, 2008) have been extensively used in the freight modeling literature. In addition, Nash equilibrium models and compensation principle models have been used to formulate alternative stakeholder behavior and decision making process (Wang, 2001; Zhang, 2008) . Harker (1985) presents a comprehensive summary of research in this field up to 1985. Therefore, the paper reviews models that have been formulated over the two and a half decades.
Most former models captured the simultaneous and sequential interactions of shippers or/and carriers in the intercity freight transport system (Fang & Peterson, 1980; Florian & Los, 1982; Harker, 1983; Friesz et al., 1983; Freisz et al., 1984; Pang, 1984; Harker et al., 1986a; Harker et al., 1986c; Dafermos & Narguney, 1987; Harker, 1988; Guelat et al., 1990; Miller et al., 1991; Hurley & Petersen, 1994; Fernandez et al., 2003; Agrawal & Ziliaskopoulos, 2006; Cheng, 2006; Yang et al., 2007; Xu & Holguin-Veras, 2009 ). On the other hand, Xiao and Yang (2007) initially attempted to find game theoretical relationships among three stakeholder groups including one shipper, and multiple carriers and infrastructure companies.
The models frequently used the three modeling approaches briefly mentioned above, freight network equilibrium (Harker, 1988; Guelat et al., 1990; Hurley & Petersen, 1994; Fernandez et al., 2003; Agrawal & Ziliaskopoulos, 2006; Cheng, 2006; Xiao & Yang, 2007) , spatial price equilibrium (Fang & Peterson, 1980; Florian & Los, 1982; Friesz et al., 1983; Freisz et al., 1984; Pang, 1984; Dafermos & Narguney, 1987; Xu & Holguin-Veras, 2009 ) and integrated network equilibrium (Harker, 1983; Harker et al., 1986a; Harker et al., 1986c) . Miller et al. (1991) and Yang et al. (2007) (Wang, 2001; Zhang et al., 2008; Kuroda et al., 2005; Zan, 1999; Min & Guo, 2010; Dimitriou & Stathopoulos; 2011) . The studies formulated models capturing sequential interactions between shippers and ocean carriers or port terminal operators, assuming decisions of the other carriers are given. User equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, spatial price equilibrium and compensation principle were used for the individual stakeholder problems. For multi-level games, Stackelberg game or multileader-follower game was applied depending on the number of leaders.
Most relevant articles have considered perfectly competitive markets where all non-cooperative players have the same market share. On the other hand, Weskamp (1985) and Dafermos (1987) studied the production and distribution behavior of oligopolistic shippers in spatially separated markets via Cournot-Nash oligopolistic equilibrium. Miller et al. (1991) presented the spatial Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot competitive network equilibrium problem. One of the oligopolists, the Stackelberg firm was assumed to be the leader firm in making production and shipping decisions. The leader expects the reactions of the other firms in the oligopolistic industry. Nagurney (1999) formulated a spatial oligopoly model capturing supply-side of the transportation service and facility on the general transportation network. Wang (2001) presented the oligopolistic carriers' pricing and routing problem subject to shippers' spatial price equilibrium.
Few studies have perceived distinctive roles of different types of carries and their relationships fully in the multimodal freight transportation system. This paper formulates a three-level model capturing interactions among ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators using multi-level optimization programming. The model reflects the oligopolistic market of the carriers in an international maritime transport setting. Fig. 1 depicts a multimodal network including the ocean carrier network, land carrier network and port terminal network. The network shows actual transportation routes and modes in the maritime freight transportation system. Nodes represent origins, destinations and intermediate points for changes in types of services, modes or routes. Links express alternative routes between the nodes. The ocean carrier network has port links to access port terminals on the water side and the land carrier network has port links to access port terminals on the land side. Each port terminal has the port sub-network which shows both physical locations and types of port services such as loading, unloading, moving and storing freight.
Problem Definition

Network Structure
Modeling Assumptions
Basic assumptions for the definiteness and simplicity of modeling are presented as follows:
1. No movement of land carriers to reach a port is considered, since commodities are assumed to be produced near the departure port terminal. 2. Ocean carriers choose a port terminal of the alternative ones located within a region.
3. For port determinants, the port location and service charge are defined with an assumption that other port service conditions are similar. 4. Oligopolistic and competitive carriers have independent operations, respectively. 
Modeling Approaches
The behavior of oligopolistic carriers is formulated at each level using Nash equilibrium to find the optimal service charge and routing pattern for which each carrier obtains the greatest profit in the competitive environment. Interactions among the different types of carriers are captured in a three-level model. At the first level, oligopolistic ocean carriers aim to maximize individual profits. Each ocean carrier determines the profit based upon the ocean carrier service demand function and the ocean transportation cost function. At the second level, oligopolistic port terminal operators attempt to maximize individual profits. Each port terminal operator decides the profit from the port throughput function and the port service cost function. At the third level, oligopolistic land carriers aim to maximize individual profits. Each land carrier determines the profit based on the land carrier service demand function and the land transportation cost function.
Hierarchical interactions occur between ocean carriers and port terminal operators, and port terminal operators and land carriers, respectively. At the upper level interaction, port service charges affect ocean carriers' routes, while port throughputs are influenced by the routing decisions. Ocean carriers choose a port terminal of the alternative ones, considering the transportation network as well as port determinants such as the port location and service charge. At the lower level interaction, land carrier service demands are determined from the port throughputs. 
Mathematical Formulation Nomenclature
Indices
, and is assumed to be a row vector.
Ocean carrier problem
Equilibrium condition
Nash Equilibrium is used to find the optimal service charge and routing pattern for which each ocean carrier obtains the greatest profit. No ocean carrier can get better profit by changing its decisions unilaterally at equilibrium.
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The ocean link transportation cost function ( 
Properties of the objective function
Since Hessian matrix (second derivatives of the objective function) is negative definite, the objective function is strictly concave in _ , ( , ) .
Feasible region of the objective function
The feasible region of the ocean carrier objective function (OFR) is defined by linear equality and nonnegativity constrains. 
Eq. (8) ensures that the total transportation demand from i via j to w is equivalent to the sum of individual ocean carrier service demands as well as the sum of ocean carrier flows on all used paths between i and j. These linear equality constrains define a closed and convex feasible region. Eq. (9) ensures that the ocean transportation service charge ranges from a small number to a large number. Eq. (10) states non-negativity of the ocean carrier service charge and flow.
Mathematical formulation
An ocean carrier VI model is formulated based on the objective function properties and OFR. Oligopolistic ocean carrier o finds the optimal service charge and routing pattern. Each ocean carrier exhibits a system equilibrium-like behavior to minimize the total cost of the vessels belonging to it.
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Port Terminal Operator Problem
Equilibrium Condition
Nash equilibrium is also used to find the optimal port service charge and pattern for which each port terminal operator obtains the greatest profit.
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Objective Function
The objective of port terminal operator p is to maximize the profit ( 
Assumptions for the Objective Function
The port throughput function of port terminal operator p ( p G ) is assumed to be strictly monotonically decreasing in the port service charge (
The port path service cost function ( Eq. (17) ensures that the total amount of freight transported via ocean paths is equivalent to the throughputs of the port terminal operator p if ocean paths are connected to the port terminal. Also, the throughput is equivalent to the sum of port flows on all used paths in a port complex. Eq. (18) ensures that the port service charge ranges from a small number to a large number. Eq. (19) states non-negativity of the port service charge and flow.
Mathematical Formulation
A port terminal operator VI model is formulated based on the objective function properties and PFR.
( ) ( *, *)( *) ( *)( *) 0
Land Carrier Problem
The equilibrium condition and objective function are similarly expressed with the ocean carrier problem. The feasible region of the land carrier objective functions (LFR) is defined below.
Eq. (21) ensures that the total amount of freight treated at k is equivalent to the sum of land carrier service demands departing from k. Eq. (22) ensures that the total land carrier service demand for O-D pair kw is equivalent to the sum of land flows on all used land paths between k and w. Eq. (23) ensures that the land transportation service charge ranges from a small number to a large number. Eq. (24) states non-negativity of the land carrier service charge and flow.
A land carrier VI model is formulated in Eq. (25).
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Three-level model
A three-level model is formulated to capture hierarchical interactions among the three types of carriers in the oligopolistic and competitive carrier environment. The vector form is shown below.
( )
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Solution Algorithm
Algorithms to solve the three-level model are developed as follows.
Ocean carrier problem r r r r r = + + + + + for O-D pair kw. Let g denote the order of land carrier l and u denote the order of land path ph-l. Let v and z denote the order of the iteration, each. Set g: =1, u:=1, v:=1, z:=1. 5 σ and 6 σ are preset tolerances.
Step 1 Step 2 
Numerical Example
A multimodal freight network is tested to show the application and capability of the model. The solution algorithms are implemented in MATLAB and executed on a PC with Pentium IV 2.00 GHz CPU (4.00 GB of RAM). The carrier network includes 18 nodes (i1, j1, j2, k1, k2, x1~x12, w1) , 8 ocean links (lk_o1~lk_o8), 11 port links (lk_p1~lk_p11) and 10 land links (lk_l1~lk_1l0). Ocean carriers have an O-D pair including 2 alternative sets of (i1, j1) and (i1, j2). Each port terminal has an O-D pair of (j1, k1) and (j2, k2). Land carriers have 2 O-D pairs of (k1, w1) and (k2, w1). 950 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) are assumed to be transported from an origin and a destination during a time period. 4 oligopolistic ocean carrier companies having the capacity ranging from 210 TEUs to 300 TEUs deliver containers via 8 waterways. The ocean transportation service charge is determined between $800 and $900 per a unit of freight. The port service charge ranges from $300 to $400 in each port terminal. 4 and 3 oligopolistic land carriers having the capacity ranging from 100 to 300 transport containers for 2 O-D pairs of (k1, w1) and (k2, w1), respectively. Land transportation service charge ranges from $250 to $320. Table A.1~ Table A .5 in the Appendix shows parameters in the functions. Table 1 shows the ocean carrier revenue, transportation cost and profit under the competitive game. Each ocean carrier minimizes the total transportation cost through a system equilibrium-like behavior. Hence, the marginal transportation cost to deliver a unit of freight via any ocean path is equivalent. Table 2 illustrates the flow and the marginal and total transportation costs of ocean carrier 1 as a sample. The marginal transportation cost is estimated at $616 on the ocean link. Table 3 shows the port terminal operator revenue, service cost and profit under the competitive game, according to the ocean carrier competitive game. With the port throughputs determined by ocean carrier routings, port terminal operators attempt to minimize port service costs in their port terminals. The marginal port service cost to handle a unit of freight via any port path in a port terminal is equivalent. Table 4 illustrates the flow and the marginal and total service costs of port terminal operator 1. The flow of port terminal operator 1 is determined when the marginal port service cost is $240 on the port link. The land carrier service demands for O-D pairs of (k1, w1) and (k2, w1) are determined from the port throughputs of port terminal operator 1 and 2, respectively. Table 5 shows the land carrier revenue, transportation cost and profit under the competitive game, according to the competitive games of ocean carriers and port terminal operators. Table 6 shows the flow and the marginal and total transportation costs of land carrier 1, for an O-D pair of (k1, w1). The marginal transportation cost is determined at $197 on the land link. 
Conclusions
The paper formulated a three-level model which captures interactions among oligopolistic ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators in maritime freight transportation networks by a multi-level optimization programming. The carrier competition frequently exhibits an oligopolistic nature due to dominant carriers and the merger of the carriers' industry. Therefore, this research provides a useful tool to examine and understand the dynamics and the decision-making processes of various stakeholders involved in the oligopolistic freight shipping market.
The developed model can be extended to a more comprehensive model including decisions of other key stakeholders such as shippers and pubic bodies (i.e., Port Authorities) and interactions among them. Also, a monopolistic market or a collusive environment of carriers through alliances may be considered in future studies. 
